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This paper presents observations and critical assessment of the current Marine Corps 
capabilities in terms of distributed Command and Control (C2), expeditionary power, and 
the feasibility of larger Enhanced Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations 
(EMO) with regard to current and emerging technology-enabled capabilities as applied to 
small unit operations such as those in support of disaster response missions. Observations 
are limited to the scope of the team’s viewpoint from deployment to multiple locations 
within the disaster zone in support of 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and 
subsequent Joint Task Force (JTF) 505 operations. It is intended to guide discussion 
among leaders in the research and acquisitions communities guiding the modernization of 
the Marine Corps.   
 As a result of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Hastily Formed Networks 
(HFN) Center’s experiences in Guiuan and Tacloban, the authors have identified a 
startling disconnect between the stated priorities of Marine Corps expeditionary strategy 
and concepts and the demonstrated capability to conduct distributed command and 
control. Specifically, there was a demonstrated lack of equipment and capability in terms 
of data connectivity on the tactical edge of operations. While the Marine Corps continues 
to show exceptional expeditionary maneuver from the sea, its ability to gain the 
maximum benefits of operational tempo and information dominance from that maneuver 
is shorted by its available C4I tools. This paper seeks to address these shortfalls by 
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offering potential strategic technological solutions for investigation and testing in the 
acquisitions cycle.  
 
The report reflects the viewpoints of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 




 On 7 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, 
Philippines with sustained winds at 315 km/h, making it the strongest tropical cyclone in 
recorded history.  The number of confirmed fatalities rose to over 5,500, with an 
additional 1.9 million people homeless and 600,000 displaced. Upon request from the 
government of the Philippines and on behalf of the US State Department, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) was directed to respond to the disaster zone and assist in disaster relief 
operations. The principal task force during the initial phase of the military operation was 
centered on the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB). This force would later 
evolve into a Joint Task Force (JTF). 
 At the request of 3d MEB and III Marine Expeditionary Force’s Science & 
Technology (3 MEF/S&T) division, the Naval Postgraduate School HFN Center 
deployed a small communications team to assist in the establishment of critical 
communications links using commercially available equipment. The team deployed to 
Manila and subsequently to Tacloban, Cebu, and Guiuan, as shown in Figure 1, to 
provide limited expeditionary C2 support and technology assessments on behalf of the 





The primary author deployed as a member of the NPS HFN team and was able to 
experience the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept in its true form. The 
members of the team were enthusiastic to see what sort of capabilities the Marines would 
bring to the crisis as this is, at its heart, the core mission of the Marines: power projection 
from the sea in crisis response.   
 The HFN team’s initial involvement with the MEB and JTF was positive. The 
team trained and equipped public and civil affairs teams on the use of the Broadband 
Global Access Network (BGAN) ground terminals. These terminals, about the size of a 
small laptop, provided Internet access to the teams as they maneuvered throughout the 
area of operations (AO). Their small size and limited power requirements were perfect 
for these small unit deployments, despite their limited, ~200 kbps, bandwidth.  
 In the spirit of distributed operations doctrine, the primary author and a fellow 
Marine from the NPS HFN team formed a two-person team that rapidly pushed forward 
to Guiuan in order to fill a communications gap while the principal Marine force in 
Guiuan completed their turnover with the local government as well as the substantial 
NGO presence, which by then had arrived. It is this small two-person team activity that 
will be the focus of this document.  
  
2. Leveraging Expeditionary Power Projection Phasing to Satisfy C2 
Requirements 
 
“Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025” explicitly states the Marine Corps of the 
future must be prepared to live in austere environments and retain the ability to operate as 
the Nation’s “expeditionary force in readiness” for potential crises regardless of time and 
location (USMC, 2007). This is especially poignant for Marines today as they pivot their 
strategic priorities to the Pacific theater of operations. Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL) has been conducting a campaign of experiments in Camp 
Pendleton, 29 Palms, and Hawaii to test the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary 
to making this vision a reality (MCWL, 2010). This family of experiments has centered 
on the Enhanced MAGTF Operations (EMO) concept and, specifically, the employment 
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of a Company Landing Team (CLT). EMO essentially means being able to deploy 
multiple self-supporting small units at a company level or below in a widely distributed 
manner from an expeditionary sea base aboard the amphibious fleet in a rapid, flexible 
manner. In all cases reviewed for this paper, line units involved in these experiments 
accomplished the objective warfighting functions of maneuver and fires. This is due to 
the fact that the Marine Corps has been successfully conducting operations in this 
distributed manner for the past 12 years in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
The thought of having platoons and companies geographically separated by large 
distances and with greater firepower and lift assets than doctrine specifies is not news to 
any officer deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in the past 12 years. Marine units are no 
longer attempting to operate in a distributed manner; rather, they are expected to do so. It 
is with this expectation that we return to Guiuan. 
The initial phases of opening the airstrip at Guiuan went according to the best-laid 
plans for US military deployment to a disaster or combat zone. Elements of US Army 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) were inserted to secure a landing site for follow-on 
forces. In Guiuan, a small SOF team was able to provide security for the town’s primary 
airfield, conduct local reconnaissance, make initial assessments, and provide terminal 
guidance for the first wave of conventional forces.  The C2 systems that allowed for this 
capability were the standard-issue communications suite carried by a SOF team. The 
basic gear included satellite phones, data terminals for both encrypted and open 
communications using the Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) capability, and traditional 
Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency military, or “green-gear,” communications 
equipment.  
 The follow-on Marines employed an impressive array of organizational 
capabilities. An airspace control team was inserted to provide air traffic control for 
military and civilian aircraft. A Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) team was 
inserted to establish a forward refueling point (FARP) to allow for rotary wing aircraft to 
push further inland into Samar Province and other remote areas. A Civil Affairs Team 
(CAT) was also included to identify and assess relief efforts and facilitate transition to 
local government control of the relief operations. This deployment pattern is consistent 
with the over-the-horizon ship-to-objective maneuver doctrine embodied by the EMO 
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concept. Moreover, it worked! This methodology allowed the Marines to facilitate an 
impressive outpouring of support to the area despite the adverse, tragic conditions. 
However, the functioning of these USMC teams was initially hampered by a lack of C2 
communications support.  
After the USMC forces attempted to relieve the SOF team, the C2 shortfall 
quickly became apparent. The Marines arrived without the ability to maintain a data link 
to higher headquarters or to maintain uninterrupted communication (voice) over their 
struggling Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) satellite network in the difficult 
environmental conditions of the tropical monsoon season.  As a result of the shortfall, the 
air control units were unable to receive the air tasking order (ATO), which caused some 
potentially dangerous airspace deconfliction situations as military and civilian air traffic 
had to be spotted visually (again, in tropical monsoon season) and contacted on open 
channels. Unfortunately, aircrews did not consistently monitor those channels.  Further, 
the CAT was unable to push products back to higher headquarters or get orders or 
guidance on the role of US military involvement for this nuanced period of transition to 
local government forces.  
The operational impact of the C2 shortfall required the SOF team to be retained 
on site so as to leverage their communications capability, thereby preventing the SOF 
team from prosecuting their mission to deploy further into remote areas to reconnoiter 
relief efforts needed there. This would become the case with the other three SOF teams in 
country where the Marines were sent to relieve them. The larger, more robust Marine 
presence essentially relied on an eight-man Army Special Operations Team because the 
Marines’ deployment package lacked the critical C2 capability necessary to meet mission 
requirements.  
 
3. NPS Involvement: 
There is an Infantry adage that states, “Without communications you’re just 
camping.”  The NPS team, composed of two graduate students, arrived with a camping 
tent, and two pelican cases. Within 30 minutes of its arrival, the team deployed a 300+ 
Watt solar-farm (Figure 1), established Internet access over commercial satellite service 
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(Figure 2), and configured a wireless local area network (WLAN) extending the Internet 
access to the Marine CAT in Guiuan. 
However, it would be unfair to say the NPS solution solved all the connectivity 
problems. For example, the BGAN and its associated power supply were not sufficiently 
hardened to military specifications to allow for constant operations even in the driving 
rains of the tropical monsoon season we experienced, which is representative of 
environmental challenges faced by military forces operating in the Pacific theater of 
operations. However, these systems clearly demonstrated the utility of lightweight 
commercial-off-the-shelf assets for rapid establishment of critical C2 capability. Nor was 
this system’s success in any way a testament to our technical prowess. Rather, it 
highlights an important point: the efficient, rapidly deployable solutions to many of the 
Marine Corps’ C2 problems are already available. So much so that NPS HFN team’s 
little setup was rendered obsolete when Cisco’s TacOps team arrived in the following 
days and established a satellite communications (SATCOM) site with two 2.4-meter 
inflatable dishes and a small, relatively quiet generator. This increased the available 
reach-back bandwidth from our 200kbps BGAN to 2-3 Mbps with the deployment of the 
Cisco Ground Antenna Transmit and Receive [GATR] system. Further, the TacOps 
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package included support for a larger diameter wireless local area network (WLAN), 
providing greater freedom of movement for users accessing the GATR capabilities. All of 
the Cisco gear came in a set of about two pelican cases per dish system. The array of 
potential C2 solutions provided by this TacOps suite in such an austere environment was 
staggering. However, the portability and low power requirements of the initial NPS-HFN 
suite demonstrate the potential to support a system proportioned for small tactical units.  
These small form-factor systems stand in stark contrast to the suite of equipment 
being pushed to the operating forces. While there is a place for robust, military-grade 
tactical networks such as those formed by the Advanced Networking Wireless Waveform 
(ANW2) capable suite of tactical radios coupled with Panasonic Toughbooks, the result 
is an incredibly cumbersome, difficult to use, and large form-factor system driven by 
requirements established to support a maneuver force less suited for distributed, small-
unit, extended MAGTF operations.  
Efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to 
test and field a new family of systems, specifically the Joint Tactical Radio Systems’ 
(JTRS) Handheld Manpack Small Form Fit (HMS) family of hardware (GAO, 2013). 
While this program is going into its full-rate decision phase of acquisitions, we must 
admit to ourselves that we have allowed our C2 to be out-cycled by technological 
advances, most of which have become mainstream in the last decade. This lag in 
acquisitions, as a result of systemic problems that prompted the JPEO to undergo a major 
reorganization of JTRS, has caused the military to lag far behind the competitive edge of 
technological innovation with regard to distributed C2 and data capabilities (Brannen & 
Hoffman, 2011).  
A paradigm shift in thinking is required to move us away from the cumbersome 
hardware thought to support a maneuver force, which in actuality is more appropriate to a 
“portable” force that is maneuverable mostly in the sense that it periodically relocates its 
forward operating location but has extremely limited on-the-move capability. Further, 
these current systems require extensive training to be able to operate in the most basic 
conditions and do not lend themselves to an expeditionary load-out of tactical units, 
particularly in operations being conducted in inhospitable environments, such as the 
tropical regions of the South Pacific.  
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We need to leverage the fact that we are living in the age of the information 
revolution. It is just as disruptive and innovative as the industrial revolution was at the 
turn of the 19
th
 century (Alberts, Garstka, Stein, 1999). While we are not advocating that 
the military, and specifically the Marine Corps, take part in a technology race such as the 
one between Samsung and Apple with new models being adopted quarterly, we are 
advocating that we take a hard look at the potential value added by modernizing our C2. 
We already know that our Marines are exceptionally talented. They are also incredibly 
technically savvy due to the fact that most grew up within the past two decades; our 
Marines have been operating smartphones and other devices in their daily lives for some 
time, if not most of their lives. They expect to be able to see their GPS location on a 
satellite map with a list of locations around them with consumer reviews of local 
services, while simultaneously streaming music over Internet radio and getting pushed 
updates on the NFL game they are missing. Why then do they have to ‘dumb themselves 
down’ to the information systems of the past to operate in the modern military? 
Admittedly, it must be noted that there are design challenges inherent and unique to the 
military. The imperatives of operational security and necessity for physical ruggedness 
will continue to place strains on the engineering and design process. However, from a 
user-focused perspective, when a young Marine intuitively knows how to access route 
data on Google Maps on a smartphone yet needs a weeklong course to be basically 
proficient with CPOF (command post of the future, the C2 software suite used in most 
Marine operations centers), the institution has failed in its product design.  
Critics, and in fact DoD cyber security forces by behavior and policy, would 
argue that the DoD has to limit themselves due to the security concerns inherent in the 
emerging global cyber threat. With the rise of state and non-state cyber-crime and 
espionage, this is a valid concern. This emerging security environment is one that must be 
faced with both eyes open, but faced nonetheless, instead of avoiding the issue or 
cowering before the enormity of the problem. It is time we saw cyber security in a similar 
light as force protection. We don’t always give an infantry platoon its own 9-foot pre-
fabricated Hesco outpost barriers to operate behind for additional protection. The 
operational commander scales his force protection strategy to the probable threat and 
accepts a certain element of manageable risk. All the systems advocated for herein as part 
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of a C2 modernization can be encrypted and “zeroed” in much the same way as any piece 
of communications hardware in our inventory today. Vendors have already begun to 
attack this problem, as well. An example is the Harris SecNet 54 system, even now an 
“old capability” by commercial evolution comparison, which allows NSA-certified type-
1 encryption over wired and wireless communication (Harris, 2014). While a determined 
adversary might eventually break this encryption, it would be a tremendous waste of their 
limited resources given the data is more than likely very perishable anyway. Leaders 
should stop being paralyzed by the weight of cyber security, and instead learn how to 
responsibly manage the risks as military leaders have always done in other domains. In 
cases such as the typhoon where rapid, open communication was required, these less-
secure systems could be a viable solution. In military operations against technologically 
adept adversaries leaders could scale to more secure C2 solutions vetted through NSA 
and DoD cyber standards.  
 
4. Way Forward 
 In untold after action reports, operators showcase their frustration at the current 
family of systems being fielded for data-rich C2. Frequent references are made 
expressing the need for an ‘iPhone equivalent’ for use in tactical units (Infantry Officers 
Course, 2013). While the realities of combat information networking are yet at to be 
realized at that level, namely because of the need to create an LTE-equivalency
1
 without 
the expansive cellular tower infrastructure enjoyed in CONUS, there are a few ways we 
could leverage the advantages of the current generation of information technology and 
scale those systems to accept future advances.  
 The first step in modernizing Marine expeditionary C2 would be looking to create 
a true battlefield network, specifically a TCP/IP based wireless network that is as mobile 
as the force element being supported – networking-on-the-move. This would create the 
ecosystem in which all other tactical devices would be interacting in order to provide 
information to warfighters and decision-makers. The HFN center at NPS has found 
multiple systems that it has tested in real world scenarios that are commercially available 
                                                        
1 Noteworthy are current efforts such as the Kearsarge ARG LTE-pilot program under NAVAIR 
(http://gcn.com/articles/2013/03/11/navy-4gs-ship-to-ship-communications.aspx) 
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‘off the shelf’ (COTS). At the very least, these COTS systems could provide Internet-
enabled communications in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. They 
might well be leveraged for the tactical realm, as well.  Two promising areas of research 
for creating this network are the use of mobile LTE base-stations and the Mobile Ad-Hoc 
Networking (MANET) family of radios being developed by various vendors.  
 In the cellular solution, base-station devices, which are essentially man-portable 
cell towers, could be carried by units, which would interconnect all the peripheral devices 
(tablets, smartphones, etc.) in that unit to a larger network. These base-stations would, in 
turn, talk to each other and scale-out to create a larger information network, coordinating 
and managing device-access thereby enhancing the information security posture. In the 
absence of base-station (“eNode/RAN”) devices, individuals could leverage other organic 
handset communications capabilities, such as WiFi or Bluetooth radios to connect to 
available IP networks, or as peripheral devices for mobile commercial satellite servers. 
Such is the advantage of multi-radio capable devices, such as most COTS tablets or 
smartphones. 
 While discussing the topic of cellular communication, we should also recognize 
the utility of using military cell phones on an existing host-nation network. Cellular 
technology is becoming more and more widespread in the developing parts of the world, 
where the cost of installing cellular infrastructure is often significantly less than wired 
infrastructures, both in manpower, cost and time. Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and other US international actors often deploy to locations such as the 
Philippines with phones ready to accept a SIM card for the local network. In our 
operations with 3d MEB, the JTF, and the Multinational Task Force, we saw simple text 
and cellular email overshadow the C2 systems brought by the Marine Corps. Text 
became the most reliable means of communication between C2 nodes. Also, in discussion 
with disaster crews, we found that many cellular towers remained intact following the 
typhoon. Replacing the cellular antennas on these towers allowed the cell network to 
rapidly come back online. From a military perspective, this allows opportunities to use a 
host nation network to assist in coordination in the uncontested arenas, such as HA/DR 
operations, as well as the possibility of co-opting an adversary network to use encrypted 
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virtual private network (VPN) technology to exploit the connectivity of an existing 
cellular system (Kaul, Makaya, Subir, Shur, Samtani, 2011). 
 In Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) solutions each radio in the network 
essentially acts as a repeater for every other radio, directly or indirectly. This type of 
communication is sometimes referred to as mobile mesh networking, where a limited 
number of Internet access points are directly reachable by a subset of the users, each of 
which participate with all associated users to form an autonomous multi-hop intra-
network connecting every user to the Internet (or reach-back network in the case of a 
private enterprise network). Essentially, these emerging systems have man-portable units 
which act as limited routers for data and voice. In simple terms: if A can talk to B, and B 
can talk to C, then A can talk to C through B. These units also offer simultaneous voice 
and data broadcast and connectivity to peripheral devices via Bluetooth or traditional 
802.11 Wi-Fi. When compared with conventional military doctrine, such as the use of 
tactical connecting files used to maintain position information between adjacent 
maneuver elements, overwatch positions, and support by fire positions, it is easy to see 
how this networking scheme lends itself to military formations. With MANET systems, 
each of these tactical units can become retransmission nodes and create an 
internetworked-whole, which will scale and self-heal as units move and terrain changes.  
 Once the ecosystem is created, we must find a way to create a reliable data trunk 
to the network. This is our means of accessing an outside network, such as the Secret 
Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) or Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) 
networks in DoD. Several options are available to achieve this dynamic reach-back 
capability, to include, satellite (SATCOM), power-UAV, and lighter-than-air (non-
powered) UAVs such as high altitude balloons or dirigibles. Several factors must be 
considered when employing any of these options, to include impact on maneuver 
operations, endurance, ease of set-up and recovery, payload/data capacity, reliability, 
availability and assured access. In the expeditionary environment, where there is no 
existing infrastructure, on-the-move SATCOM offers significant advantage. While we 
have performed several UAV-based communications-relay field experiments, the 
architecture’s reliability and availability is uncertain, impacted by mission priorities and 
asset attachment, that is, organizational control. While existing commercial services, such 
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as the BGAN systems used above, offer both portable and on-the-move solutions, the 
data rates are insufficient to support enduring communications requirements beyond the 
most limited C2 needs, emerging systems such as the INMARSAT GlobalXpress, and 
O3b (Other 3 Billion) networks purport higher data rates to be measured in tens to 
hundreds of megabits per second (INMARSAT, 2014; O3B, 2014). The military has also 
begun to launch its own MUOS (multiple user objective system) satellite constellation to 
provide a similar, secure capability, despite its vastly lower data rates (Lockheed Martin, 
2014).
 
A SATCOM solution evolves and scales, as well, with initial forces simply 
conducting voice communications over the netted Iridium systems being currently tested 
by MCWL. Then after an initial foothold is established, a unit could quickly set up the 
static systems necessary for higher bandwidth data, much as they would have done in the 
past with HF radio systems and their associated antenna array. While their current form-
factor needs militarization and testing in a man-portable format, systems such as the very 
small aperture (VSAT) terminals from ViaSat and the phased-array self-tracking systems 
such as those by Phasor Solutions should be closely evaluated for future military use. The 
latter may well be suited for on-the-move operations, too. When bridged to the existing 
tactical network and leveraging the ubiquitous IP deployment, these systems would allow 
data transfers not only between networked tactical units but also between them and 
offshore or distant higher headquarters and their servers.  
 Finally the core value for leveraging emerging commercial capabilities, both 
communications systems and handheld/user-access devices involves the establishment of 
a synergistic application layer, ‘meshed’ together by the integration of a distributed IP–
based network. This is an ecosystem of applications for multiple levels of computing that 
allow all users on a network to add greater value through a shared information 
environment. The principle driving this is straightforward: survivability and mission 
success are valued highest by those conducting that mission. We contend that our 
Marines are intelligent actors capable of leveraging or adapting all available tools to 
complete their mission in the most force-conserving and asset-efficient manner possible. 
This applies to information as well. The traditional intelligence cycle relies on 
information being collected at the tactical edge, transported to higher headquarters, 
processed, and redistributed according to a set reporting-schedule. With the advent of the 
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company level intelligence cell (CLIC) in OIF and OEF, this process is undergoing a 
metamorphosis. Companies are conducting intelligence processing typically reserved for 
battalions, and the Marine Corps is looking at modifying the manning of companies to 
allow for this expanded capability.  
This process could be further revolutionized if each tactical level element was 
able to access a central intelligence and operations database at will and extract or upload 
data (often referred to in the literature as “smart push-user pull” or “smart pull-
dependable push”) as it becomes relevant to their mission. Time and again edge units 
rapidly adapt and innovate in response to complex problems. A synergistic application 
layer would further fuel this phenomenon by creating a free-flow of information among 
all nodes on a distributed network. Thus, when a squad patrol is re-tasked for another 
objective it would only take that squad leader a few moments to look up new imagery and 
intelligence reporting on the new objective through his smartphone or tablet. Units could 
be queried directly if they are found to have operated in an emerging or evolving area of 
interest or should higher headquarters require specific, critical, time-sensitive 
information.  Post-strike status of a target could be transmitted to a central database in 
real or near-real time to reduce the need for repeat raids. Most importantly, Marines will 
find new uses for the data created not just by higher headquarters but by any Marine 
using the network.  
 Just as critical as an agile, interconnected, synergistic application layer is an 
ability to sustain this system in the presence of a plethora of other devices that Marines 
are expected to use in the modern operational environment, each requiring consumption 
of a valuable commodity in austere environments: electricity. One account from the NPS 
HFN team found the team leader arriving at an airfield to find an officer with an issued 
Blackberry phone on its last legs frantically trying to get a last email or text out before it 
died as it was his only way to reach back to higher headquarters and he had no way of 
recharging it. In this situation, as well as the airfield in Guiuan, the HFN team was able to 
supply limited continuous power through a collapsible small solar panel system that also 
charged BA2590 batteries for night operations. The HFN lab has also utilized fuel cell 
systems using propane as well as other gas sources such as methane; and small wind 
turbines. The advantage of these systems is their small form factor and ease of setup and 
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breakdown. The solar panels, easily folded and transported, offered peak power of over 
300 watts, and could simultaneously charge six batteries for use in other devices or to 
sustain operations in inclement weather and nighttime. In the case of fuel cells, propane is 
commonly available in many developing and developed countries and could be acquired 
in extremis if necessary. Again, a large military generator is not always required for every 
mission. Small systems like these are just the kind of thing our units should be packing in 
distributed operations in austere environments. 
 
Fig 3 – Bren-Tronics Solar Power System in Guiuan, Philippines  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations: 
 The purpose of this paper is to encourage forward thinking by Marine 
organizations as well as individual Marines. MCWL has conducted multiple large-scale 
experiments using the same concepts listed above; their results are available through the 
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. Both MCWL and NPS have tested advanced 
MANET systems, such as the TrellisWare radio system and Persistent Systems Wave 
Relay system (MCWL, 2010; Chatzigiannis, 2012). The urgency of equipping Marines 
with emerging technologies; adapting techniques, tactics, and procedures to leverage the 
potential of these technologies; and encouraging innovation by our young Marines cannot 
be overstated. After seeing first-hand how inadequate our distributed C2 capability is in 
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the realities of modern data-driven, austere real world instances, it is frustrating to see the 
potential for solutions so readily available left under utilized or effectively ignored. The 
same principal applies to emerging expeditionary power capabilities with advances in 
solar and fuel cell technology. What is necessary is aggression in the acquisitions process 
with regard to these emergent requirements, leveraging the technology advancements 
being fueled by consumer demands, and a radical re-imagining of battlefield C2 
architecture. This is an effort that must be DoD-wide, as these problems are not specific 
to only the Marine Corps. Simultaneously, these technologies should be leveraged to 
enable interoperability, both within DoD and externally to UN/NATO operations and 
other government agencies (OGAs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We 
must transition from constrained radio-nets to a true battlefield internetwork. Once we 
start to do so, efficiencies, emerging opportunities, and unforeseen possibilities will begin 
to arise at a fast pace, allowing for the innovation critical to the transformation necessary 
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